issues concerning ethnicity and nationalism in Africa. A striking feature of this debate is that the proponents of Casamangais independence have doggedly maintained that theirs is not an ethnic movement. Conversely, the MFDC's opponents, in particular the Senegalese government, have tended to argue that the MFDC represents an ethnic (Jola) constituency and that the MFDC aims to establish what they refer to as the 'Jola Republic'. This republic, it is claimed, would encompass portions of Senegal, the Gambia, and Guinea-Bissau.
The sides taken by the MFDC and the government can be explained in terms of an underlying distinction in African political ideology between nationalism and ethnicity. During the founding of the Organisation of African Unity African leaders self-consciously adopted a territorial model of nationalism (see Smith, 1986: 137 ). The ethnic model was delegitimised. In Senegal this territorial approach to nationalism has had a tremendous impact on politics and in the public imagination. The narrowly defined interests of ethnic groups are not considered a legitimate foundation for political mobilisation. To be legitimate, political groups should represent an ethnically plural constituency. This commitment to plural nationalism and plural political interest groups has informed efforts by the Senegalese government to 'play the ethnicity card' in an attempt to delegitimise the political goals and aspirations of the MFDC. This was not the last time I encountered expressions of Casamanqais identity. It is ubiquitous in the daily life of the Jola, whether they live in the Casamance or in Dakar, Senegal's capital. Expressions of this identity, be they regional or ethnic, can be seen, for example, in the social distance many urban Jola maintain between themselves and their non-Jola and nonCasamancais neighbours. The community among whom I conducted research were acutely aware of their status as 'strangers' in urban Senegal. They were aware of the economic niches they filled in the urban economy: many of the women worked as domestics, and men worked in the military or in factories. Many believed that they were relegated to lower-status jobs because urban Senegal, and Dakar in particular, is culturally, politically, and economically dominated by the Wolof, a 'northern' Senegalese ethnic group.
These urban expressions of difference are inextricably tied to, as the Senegalese put it, the region's 'particularism'. Casamance is unlike Senegal's other regions, in the opinion of many Senegalese. Most Senegalese considered this 'particularism' intelligible, given the region's experience under colonial rule and, most important, the way in which the scramble for Africa unfolded in this part of the continent. On the eve of the Berlin The way in which the Gambia bisects Senegal throws the socio-cultural differences between ethnic groups north and south of the Gambia into sharp relief. Ethnic groups historically located north of the Gambia, such as the Wolof and Halpulaar, are generally viewed as hierarchical. That is, they are casted, centralised societies which are in many respects similar to other groups of the Sudan such as the Manding, Peul, and Bambara. In contrast, the Jola are viewed as having had segmentary societies which, to an extent because of this feature, are seen to share more cultural similarities with people in Guinea-Bissau than with the other peoples of Senegal.
The ancient cultural affinities between the Jola and the peoples of GuineaBissau are believed to have been reinforced during the colonial era. As late as 1886 the Casamance, similar to Guinea Bissau, was largely under Portuguese control. The lusophone influence remains a characteristic of Ziguinchor. It presents a sharp contrast to the heavy francophone influence of northern Senegal. To this can be added the vast movements of peoples that have historically occurred, and continue to occur, across the SenegalGuinea-Bissau border.
Since the 1982 uprising the Senegalese government has had good reason to be alarmed by the separatist aspirations of the MFDC. The economic stakes are high. The Casamance covers one-seventh of Senegal's land mass and is the nation's most verdant region. The Casamance is the destination of choice for tourists who visit Senegal, it has considerable potential for the development of commercial agriculture, and is estimated to have roughly one billion barrels of unexploited oil reserves (Reuters, 1992) . In addition to being anxious about losing the economic wealth of the region, as well as setting a precedent for border changes, the Senegalese government, some have speculated, fears the emergence of an economic union between the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and an independent Casamance, a union which might challenge Senegal's regional economic hegemony.
Before 1990 the subversive side of Casamangais regionalism, the CasamanSais nationalist position, was concealed from public view. It was disseminated by word of mouth and through banned publications. During my fieldwork, prior to the resurgence of violence in 1990, I heard informants speak of the alleged agreement between Emile Badiane and Leopold Sedar Senghor, Senegal's first President, that promised independence to the Casamance. One informant showed me some of the banned publications that set forth the MFDC's positions. With the outbreak of violence, discussions over why the Casamance should be independent moved out of informal, at times clandestine, conversations and into the public arena. The violence drew national attention to Abbe Diamacoune Senghor,6 leader of the MFDC's political wing, and gave him the opportunity to present the MFDC's reading of the history of the Casamance.
'THE FRENCH MADE THE CASAMANCE': THE ARGUMENT FOR INDEPENDENCE
One puzzle of the MFDC's struggle for independence lies in the way in which it defines CasamanSais nationalism. Many scholars suggest homogeneity of belief, practice, and/or culture as one of the most important dimensions of nationalism (see Connor, 1994; Gellner, 1983; Herzfeld, 1992; Smith, 1986 ). This cultural homogeneity can be used to feed the irredentist argument: 'We are different from them, we have a right to govern ourselves, they have no right to rule us.' This is indeed true of many separatist movements: the Catholics of Northern Ireland, the Basques of Spain, and the Palestinians of Israel, to mention a few. On the surface the situation in the Casamance lends itself well to this type of argument. Various arguments in favour of independence could be built around an assortment of apparent oppositions, Jola-non-Jola, Catholic-Muslim, Luso-Franco. This is indeed how many observers (see Darbon, 1985 Darbon, , 1988 ; Geschiere and van der Klei, 1987 Klei, , 1988 Glaise, 1990; Diouf, 1994 ) and the Senegalese government have chosen to interpret the situation.
Yet the MFDC has consistently used a different strategy. It has downplayed the relevance of cultural difference and highlighted a territorial and historicised understanding of the nature of Casamangais nationalism (see Anderson, 1983; Smith, 1986 In promoting an argument for the independence of the Casamance that is contingent on a particular reading of colonial history, the current incarnation of the MFDC has sought to distance itself from ethnic and cultural understandings of Casaman9ais nationalism. Even so, the organisation has not been able to eliminate the ethnic and religious overtones that the movement has for many Senegalese. The MFDC and Atika are probably overwhelmingly Jola. And although many Muslims, including leaders such as Sidy Badji, are among their ranks, it is widely believed that the supporters of the MFDC are primarily animist and Catholic. Dominique Darbon has pointed out that in the 1980s the Jola and the Casamance are conflated in MFDC documents (Darbon, 1985: 126) . Even Senghor has on occasion made reference to ethnic difference when presenting his historical argument for independence. For example, in an interview he claimed that Badiane should have known not to trust the Senegalese politicians because they, unlike the Jola, had not been initiated into the sacred forest (Sud Hebdo, 1 February 1990, p. 6). According to this view, the Jola are victims of a self-imposed marginalisation. They are victims of their culture, which first, prevents the emergence of hierarchical political institutions and, second, impels the Jola to reject such institutions when they are imposed from without. Not only does this understanding of Jola society deny the importance of history in understanding political violence, but also it sees the recent violence as the product of communities which reject history and retreat from its effects. The article concludes that, in the face of a strong northern economic presence in the Casamance, atomised Jola villages are fighting to preserve their culture and, by implication, their self-imposed exile from change and the world.
According to this reading of the debate, part of what the Jola are attempting to preserve is their religion. To be sure, the sacred forest is central to indigenous Jola religious practice and there is little question that this institution has had its place in organising the Casamancais resistance movement: it was in the sacred forest, for example, that the separatists gathered in December 1982 shortly before they descended on the Gouvernance in Ziguinchor (see Geschiere and van der Klei, 1988).
Buttressing claims that the separatist movement revolves around religious, as well as ethnic, loyalties and concerns is the fact that some of the most famous Jola are religious figures who are celebrated for their acts of resistance against the French. Alinsitoe Diatta, after whom Ziguinchor's stadium is named, returned to the Casamance from Dakar after receiving a vision. During the Second World War she led a resistance movement against French efforts to recruit soldiers, which led to her arrest and imprisonment in Mali, where she died. Djinabo, after whom Ziguinchor's high school is named, was an elder of a fetish and was killed in 1906 while resisting French efforts to collect taxes. Finally, in 1903 Sihalebe, a Jola 'king' after whom a rebel camp is said to have been named, was exiled to Sedhiou for organising Jola hostility to the French. Prohibited from eating or drinking in front of his subjects, Sihalebe was imprisoned with several of his followers and died of starvation (Roche, 1985: 280) .
But instead of letting the issue rest at that, the Senegalese government has gone beyond it to argue not simply that the Casamance is Senegalese but that it is archetypically Senegalese. While wedded to the position that the MFDC is a Jola organisation, the government emphasises that the Casamance is home to a variety of ethnic groups whose rights as Senegalese citizens must be respected and protected. As an article published in Le Soleil (1990a) explained, the region's ethnic pluralism makes the Casamance a microcosm of Senegal. According to this logic, the political status of the region should not be determined by the cultural idiosyncrasies of one ethnic group. Rather, it should represent the interests of all the region's inhabitants. It is plausible that the rebel movement is fuelled by feelings of economic alienation among the movement's partisans. This sense of alienation can be volatile, particularly when it intersects with the large number of discharged soldiers from the Casamance and the region's particularism. It certainly has not helped that this particularism is heavily coloured by a perception that the Casamance is economically and politically dominated by northern Senegal. Research I conducted on rural-urban migration revealed that migration is often used as a metaphor for the economic oppression of the region. Casamangais youth frequently explained their migration to Dakar in terms of the lack of employment opportunities in the Casamance, for which they often hold the Senegalese government responsible. Part of the popular oral culture of the Casamance is rumours of multinational corporations, usually American, which wanted to build fruit-processing plants and oil refineries in Ziguinchor. These plans, so it is said, have been thwarted by the Senegalese government. In a similar vein, many Casamangais are quick to speak of the government projects during the 1960s and 1970s which allocated land in Ziguinchor to 'northerners', not Casamancais (see Geschiere and van der Klei, 1988; Hesseling, 1994). And, each year, those who remain in rural villages complain about how they are exploited when 'northerners', predominantly Wolof traders, arrive in the villages to transport locally produced mangoes, oranges, and peanuts to Dakar.
Even if we reject the essentialism of the government's position, the 'Jolafication' of the movement has entered the local discourse as part of the mythico-history of the conflict. Liisa Malkki defines a mythico-history as a rendering of the past whose truth or falsity is less important than the way in which it is 'concerned with order in a fundamental, cosmological sense'. In this case the order does not involve defining 'self in distinction to other, with good and evil' (Malkki, 1995: 55) . In this case the distinction between self and other is constructed through the categories of nature and culture. The Jola, as should be apparent from the preceding discussion, stand in the array of Senegalese ethnic groups as antithetical to civilisation. This popular view renders this ethnic group, by definition, an obstacle to modern political forms, in this case Senegalese nationalism.
Much popularised Jola culture celebrates the intimate relationship that exists between the Jola and the forests in which their villages are located. Two cultural events in particular are seen by Jola and non-Jola alike to epitomise their culture. The first is the dancing of the masks, and the second is the male initiation ceremony (see Mark, 1992; Mark et al., 1998, for extended discussion of these events). The first involves the dancing of masked 'monsters' who live in the forest beyond human control yet still in intimate contact with the Jola. Although the fiction is that the masks are not danced by people, it is understood by all, except small children, that they are. The subtext is that the Jola are the forest monsters-they are the uncontrollable and untamable forces of nature.
The second event puts an exclamation point on the subtext of the dances. The Jola youth make the transition to manhood through an initiation ceremony. This is achieved by removing youth from the village and sequestering them for several weeks in the sacred forest. To become a Jola man, one must be separated from the everyday life of the village and learn the secrets of the men/forest. A public demonstration must be made of the intimacy that exists between Jola men and the forces of nature.
The parallels between the public image of the rebels and these representations of Jola maleness are striking, and they are not lost on the Senegalese public. The rebels are said to live in camps in the same forests where Jola villages are located. They live outside of everyday life and society. Many claim that they manage to elude the military because they have intimate knowledge of the forest. They are said to have mystical powers-the ability to survive otherwise lethal wounds, for example-that are derived from the forest. Given this, it is not surprising that some outside observers have argued that the sacred forest has provided the rebels with an institution from which to organise their activities. What is important is not whether this assessment is correct but rather how convincing the conclusion is in the light of the powerful symbolic association that exists between the MFDC and the Jola people.
This association so concerned the MFDC leadership that it has apparently been actively seeking the support of non-Jola. For political reasons the MFDC leadership has sought a membership which better reflects the distribution of ethnic groups in the Casamance. With such a distribution, it seems, the MFDC could more easily attack the idea that Casamanqais nationalism is built on that which some scholars assume to lie at the foundation of all nationalism: homogeneity of belief, practice, and/or culture.
ETHNICITY AND PLURAL NATIONALISM IN SENEGAL
It is not unusual for an African separatist movement to deny that it represents an ethnically based constituency. The same was true of Eritrea, Africa's only successful separatist movement, which based its claim to independence from Ethiopia on the fact that Eritrea, unlike the rest of Ethiopia, had been colonised by Italy (B. Selassie, personal communication, 1997). Among the many reasons why separatist movements frame their objectives in this way (see Neuberger, 1991; Touval, 1972) is that ethnicity and nationalism are considered distinct, even antithetical, types of political identity in African political ideology. The distinction can be traced back at least to the founding of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963, when the leaders of the newly independent African states overwhelming endorsed the status quo for the definition of national boundaries. Article 3 of its charter binds all member states to respect national boundaries as they were defined by the colonial powers. With the notable exceptions of Morocco and Somalia (see Touval, 1972) African leaders rejected the idea that their new nations should correspond to ancient kingdoms and other types of pre-colonial political and cultural formations. They unambiguously affirmed that African nationalism should be territorial and decidedly not ethnic (see Smith, 1986 ). However ambitious the task, these leaders embarked on constructing self-consciously plural nations. The challenge, as they saw it, was to build, within the boundaries defined by the European powers, a sentiment of national unity that transcended what they considered narrow ethnic concerns. The challenge, as reflected in Western scholarship of the era, was nation building and national integration. Ethnicity emerged as a perceived obstacle to achieving this goal.
Toward this end, most African nations attempted (sincerely or otherwise) to delegitimise ethnic political mobilisation, a task at which Senegalese politicians were remarkably successful. From independence to the present, Senegal's constitution has explicitly banned all political parties that appeal to ethnic loyalty.9 Senegal's political leaders-leaders of the ruling Socialist Party and the opposition alike-as well as the Senegalese public appear to have taken the prohibition to heart. None of Senegal's twenty-six political parties have been credibly accused of favouring the interests of a specific ethnic group. There is simply no place, either legally or in the opinion of the public, for ethnicity in the Senegalese political arena. While attaching the label 'ethnic' to the MFDC may appear to non-Senegalese scholars to be a neutral description, within Senegal it has political implications.
Who is to be believed, the MFDC or the government? Does the MFDC represent an ethnic or a territorial constituency? This question is not easily answered. Precious little is known about the membership and organisation of the MFDC. Over the course of the rebellion the MFDC's leadership has even appeared to lack a complete understanding of and control over its own armed units. The rebels move like shadows through the forest of the Casamance, casting images through their violence that are readily used by political leaders in whatever way they find useful.
In this article I have focused on the ways in which the MFDC leadership, the press, and the Senegalese public have sought to interpret the violence that has plagued the Casamance region of Senegal. If nothing else I hope to have presented a cautionary tale, the lesson of which is rather simple and obvious, and one that I am not the first to draw (see Newbury, 1995 ), yet which is all too often lost. We should be careful about how we use the label 'ethnic' or 'tribal', particularly as it relates to situations of conflict in Africa. I believe that few scholars would be comfortable with the extent to which the category 'Jola' has been reified and primitivised by the official Senegalese press. Indeed, when I was last in Senegal several Senegalese journalists expressed regret and shame at the role they and their colleagues played in helping to ethnicise the popular understanding of the conflict (A. Sakho, K. Sow, personal communications, 1997).
Ultimately the various understandings which have been forwarded about this conflict have to be cast against the background of current articulations of Senegalese nationalism. Diouf (1994) It is certainly true that ethnicity is often deployed to mobilise political opposition against nation states. But we should also be mindful of the fact that ethnicity is also a powerful weapon used by nation states to delegitimise and frustrate the political objectives of its minority peoples, however they may be construed. Jola culture is not doing anything to threaten the Senegalese nation. Rather, the idea that Jola culture is antithetical to nationalism undermines the idea that the Senegalese nation unites diverse ethnic groups on the basis of equality. 
